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PUBLIC PROBLEMS AND NON-DECISION MAKING*
-A STUDY OF THE TUCSON WATER SYSTEM
JOHN ADRIAN STRAAYERt
For several decades now, most major American metropolitan areas
have been plagued by ineffective traffic systems, dirty air, polluted
rivers and streams, deteriorating housing, growing slums, civil disorder, and other similarly undesirable conditions. Engineers, atmospheric scientists, social scientists, planners and others, have
studied these conditions and described and analyzed their nature,
causes and consequences. They have often called for intendedly remedial public action to solve the "problems."' But the problems
seem to remain. In fact, although some attempts to deal with them
have been made in most metropolitan areas, the problems may be
increasing both in terms of frequency and seriousness.
This article attempts to explain this phenomenon. It is argued,
with specific and detailed reference to the problem of water supply
in Tucson, Arizona, that political systems 2 in metropolitan areas
have failed to produce comprehensive and sustained programs to
alter the environment and eliminate problematic conditions. Four
related factors are suggested as accounting for this failure. They are:
(1) the relationship between the pattern of governmental organization and problem boundaries in metropolitan areas; (2) variations in
the number and nature of functions performed by metropolitan area
governments; (3) variations in the resources possessed by, and demands placed upon, metropolitan area governments; and (4) a resultant variation in the propensity of metropolitan area decision-makers
to treat a given set of environmental conditions as a public problem,
and then to incur the decision-costs 3 necessary to deal with that
problem.
*The research on Tucson was conducted in conjunction with a larger study entitled "The
Economic Implications of Water Policy in Arizona," which was funded by the U.S. Department of Interior's Office of Water Resources Research through the University of Arizona
Water Resources Research Center, and directed by Professor Maurice M. Kelso of the Uni-

versity of Arizona Department of Agricultural Economics. The author wishes to thank

Professors M. M. Kelso and David Bingham for their research guidance and Professor Phillip
0. Foss of Colorado State University for his editorial comments.
t Department of Political Science, Colorado State University.
1. Air pollution, water pollution, etc. are referred to as "conditions described by experts
as problems" rather than simply as "problems" or as "public problems" because it can
logically be argued that until a government places a question (such as airpollution) on its
official agenda, there is, to that government, no public problem.
2. The term "political system" as employed in this article simply refers, in a collective
sense, to all the governments in a metropolitan area. The term "sub-system," in turn, is used
to refer individually to any one of these governments.
3. The term "decision-costs" refers to the payments which a government must make in
terms of money, manpower, equipment and temporary neglect of other problems and other
publics whenever it chooses to allocate its limited resources to any given problem.
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Most American metropolitan areas today are plagued by a variety
of conditions which have been externally defined by experts as problems and which, we are told, demand public attention. Engineers,
social scientists and others suggest that there are problems plaguing
entire metropolitan areas which span the jurisdictional boundaries of
large numbers of governments. With most major metropolitan areas
containing dozens, even hundreds, of governments, problem areas fail
to match political boundaries and are, thus, difficult to "package."
Public action to alter unpleasant environmental conditions does
not always follow their external identification as problems. Although
decision-makers of the various governments (sub-systems) in metropolitan areas may recognize the existence of problem conditions,
they frequently choose not to define officially these conditions as
"public problems" by declining to place them on the agenda of
government. They may decide that, given their limited resources and
numerous demands, the decision-costs of dealing with a new "problem" cannot be paid.
Metropolitan area sub-systems perform a variety of functions.
They provide services for and respond to a variety of publics. Although publics and functions may overlap, different governments
generally perform different functions-or at least give priority to
different functions. For example, the prime function of a school
district, and the public to which the district responds, is not the
same as the functions performed, and the publics responded to, by a
city government. Thus, given a list of problems or services, different
governments will rank them differently in terms of seriousness and
importance.
The likelihood of public officials treating problematic conditions
as "public problems" will increase "unevenly" within metropolitan
political systems. Depending upon the ratio of resources to demands,
a government may or may not choose to incur the decision-cost
necessary to deal with a given problem. Thus, at any point in time,
and relative to any given problem, some political sub-systems may
choose to bear decision-costs and others may not. It is unlikely,
therefore, that any problem affecting an entire metropolitan area will
be dealt with by the full political system. It is more likely that the
problem will receive only the limited attention of sub-systems which
remain unable to "package" the total problem and deal with it effectively. This means that in most metropolitan areas, some efforts may
be made to eliminate air pollution, slums, etc.; but in all likelihood
these efforts will be incremental and insufficient to fully "solve" the
problems.
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Finally, the propensity of a given system, sub-system, or consortium of sub-systems to act vis-a-vis a given problem may change as
decision-makers perceive changes in the ratio of resources to demands-as the decision-costs appear to decision-makers to increase or
decrease. Such decision changes may result from variations in the
level of resources which sub-systems possess, from variations in the
level and nature of demands placed upon sub-systems by their public
or publics, or from variations in decision-makers' perceptions caused
by receipt of new information.
The persistence of the water supply "problem" in and around
Tucson, Arizona is illustrative of the phenomenon described abovethe failure of political systems to produce comprehensive and sustained programs to eliminate problem conditions. While it is generally recognized that Tucson has a water supply problem, the control
of the Tucson water system is politically fragmented and its many
sub-systems vary widely in terms of functions performed, resources
possessed and demands placed upon them. The result has been uneven system development. That is, while those in control of a few
sub-systems have initiated some action to remedy the problem, the
system collectively has failed to act. The action that has been initiated has been insufficient to solve the problem.
I
THE TUCSON WATER PROBLEM
Tucson is located in the Santa Cruz River Valley in arid southern
Arizona. Precipitation in the Valley is slight, averaging only ten
inches a year. Underlying the Valley is a large groundwater basin-the
Santa Cruz Basin. Over the years, this basin was filled by the downward percolation of rain water and mountain runoff. Geologists say
it may have taken millions of years to fill this basin. All water now
used in the Tucson area, and much of what is used in Arizona, is
drawn from groundwater basins such as the Santa Cruz. Water is
literally "mined."'
Tucson and the surrounding metropolitan area have experienced
tremendous growth in the past two decades. As indicated in Table 1,
the city grew in population from 45,454 in 1950 to 242,000 in
1967. In terms of area, Tucson grew from 9.55 square miles in 1950
to 75.96 in 1967. The population of Pima County, in which Tucson
is located, rose from 141,216 in 1950, to 335,000 in 1967.
4. The "Tucson Region" is an area including all of the City of Tucson, most of eastern
Pima County and covers 3,300 square miles.
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TABLE 1
Population and Size: Tucson and Pima County
Year
1930
1950
1960
1967

Population
City of Tucson
32,506
45,454
212,892
242,000

Pima Co.
55,675
141,216
265,000
335,000

Size in Sq. Miles
City of Tucson
Pima Co.
9.55
70.87
75.96

9,241
9,241
9,241
9,241

Source: Bureau of the Census, County-City Data Book: and G. Davis and H. C. Schwalen,
Tuscon Region's Water Use and Future Needs, on file at University of Arizona
Department-of Agriculture Engineering.

Population growth has caused an increase in water use. From 1930 to
1963, water used in the Tucson Regions increased over 300%. It is
expected to double again by the year 2000, as indicated by Table 2.
During the past several decades, Arizona, specifically the Tucson
Region- has been withdrawing groundwater faster than nature can
replace it. For example, in 1963, 2.0 million acre-feet of surface
water and 4.6 million acre-feet of groundwater were used in Arizona.
Arizona has a "fixed income water supply" of 3.6 million acre-feet a
year, made up of 2.0 million acre-feet of surface flow, and 1.6 million acre-feet of annually recharged groundwater. The result, given
the water use figure for 1963, is an annual Arizona groundwater
deficit of 3.0 million acre-feet. 6 Similarly, there was a sizable
groundwater deficit in the Tucson Region in 1963. In that year,
groundwater pumpage totaling 249,690 acre-feet while recharge was
estimated at 91,000 acre-feet. This left Tucson with a ground water
deficit for 1963 of over 150,000 acre-feet. 7
By external definition, then, there appears to be a serious water
shortage problem in the Tucson area. It has been empirically demonstrated that the level of the water table in the Santa Cruz basin has
been falling at a rapid rate. And while there is not agreement among
engineers, hydrologists and geologists as to the quantity and quality
of the remaining water, there is general agreement that early action is
needed to find and develop additional water sources. Further, some
engineers believe that additional water sources should be developed
at the earliest possible date so that the remaining local groundwater
may be used as a "water bank" for peak period use, thus reducing
the size and cost of schemes for importation facilities.
5. Technically, "groundwater" is subsurface water which demonstrably moves in definable channels. A second type of subsurface water is "percolating water." This is subsurface
water which, supposedly, does not move. In this article all subsurface water is referred to as
groundwater.
6. Arizona Academy, Arizona's Water Supply 2-3 (1964).
7. G. Davis and H. C. Schwalen, Water Use and Future Needs in the Tucson Region, an
unpublished report prepared for the City of Tucson.
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I!
THE TUCSON WATER SYSTEM
Water management in the Tucson area, and indeed, in all of Arizona, is highly decentralized. In many areas of the United States where
water is imported into urban areas from rivers and lakes, only large
governmental units are financially able to construct needed transmission facilities. In such areas, residents, businesses, industry,
schools and small governmental units purchase imported water, and
water management remains centralized in the hands of the importing
units.
This is not the case in Tuscon. Given the nature of the groundwater basin and the absence of restrictive legislation, it is relatively
easy, inexpensive and legal to sink wells and draw water. Consequently, dozens of organizations, both public and private, pump
water. And besides these groundwater pumpers, a number of state
and local agencies conduct regulatory activies related to water use.
Following is a brief discussion of the major institutions which participate in "managing" Tucson's water.
8

Arizona Corporation Commission
Public utilities in Arizona are "regulated monopolies." Their rates
and methods of operation are regulated by a state agency-the Arizona Corporation Commission.
Among the public utilities which the Commission regulates are
private water companies. Before a private water company may operate in Arizona its owners must secure, among other things, a "certificate of convenience and necessity" from the Commission. Applicants for a certificate must demonstrate a need for water service in
the area for which the certificate is requested and must demonstrate
the availability of potable water. They also must have previously
secured the necessary approval papers from the state and county
boards of health, the relevant county board of supervisors, and any
other state or federal agencies which, by virtue of the location of the
area for which a certificate is being requested, must be consulted.
The receipt of a certificate then entitles the company to exclusive
rights of operation within its certified area, and obligates the company to meet certain requirements. The Commission establishes the
rates which the company may charge.
A.

8. Ariz. Const. art. 15, § § 205; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § § 40-201 to -204, 40-281 to
-283, 40-321 to -322, 40-331, 40-361 to -362, 40-367 to -368, 40-374 (1956), Ariz. Corp.
Comm., Rules and Regulations Relating to the Operation of Domestic Water Utility Companies, and, personal interviews with Commissioners Milton Huskey and Richard Herbert,
Commission Utility Department Chief Robert Kircher, and Chief Engineer Lionel Blair on
July 20, 1966, and other dates.
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The sole concern of the Commission is with the establishment and
operation of the private water companies. It does not concern itself
with the issues of water supply, the decline of Arizona groundwater
tables, etc., except to assure itself that private companies actually
provide service in their certificated areas. 9
B. Pima County and State of Arizona Health Departments' 0
State and county health departments cooperatively regulate the
quality of water used by establishments which are public in nature.
These departments, pursuant to county and state ordinances and
regulations, scrutinize the establishment of water service facilities
(e.g., the physical plant of a private water company), and run regular
checks on the chemical quality of water which these establishments
dispense to the public.
C Pima County"
Besides securing a certificate of convenience and necessity from
the Corporation Commission, a private water company must obtain a
"franchise" from the board of supervisors of the county in which it
desires to operate. A franchise permits the company to run water
distribution lines through county roads. Like the Corporation Commission's certificate, a franchise is exclusive; only one is granted to
cover any particular area.
D. The City of Tucson' 2
The water department of the City of Tucson is by far the largest
water service organization in the Tucson area. The Water and Sewerage Department's Annual Report for 1964-65 lists the number of
total service connections at 60,352. The department has 206 active
wells, 1,266 miles of mains, has pumped 14,203 million gallons of
water (1964-65) and has a capitalized value of over $41 million.
9. Id.
10. Data from personal interviews with Mr. Otto L. Fritz, Chief of Division of Environmental Health, Pima County Health Department, July 28, 1966, and Mr. Frank Lord, Public
Health Engineer, Arizona Public Health Department, August 1, 1966.
11. Data from Pima County Board of Supervisors, Procedure for Securing Water Franchise; Tucson Daily Citizen, Jan. 21, 1963; Pima County Board of Supervisors, Statement of
Policy with Reference to Water Franchises, Jan. 21, 1963; Arizona Daily Star, April 16,
1965, Sec. D, at 14, col. 1; Letter from Dennis Weaver, member of Pima County Board of
Supervisors, to Jack Weadock, Assistant Publisher of Arizona Daily Star, April 9, 1965; and
personal interviews with Pima County Board of Supervisors Chairman, Thomas Jay, and
William Ernst of the County Engineering Department.
12. Data from personal interviews with Messrs. Jay Abbey, Paul Beermann, Frank
Brooks, Gordon Davis, Mark Keane, John Rausher, William Wheeler and others, all associated with the City of Tucson, plus such published materials as City of Tucson Water and
Sewerage Department, Annual Reports, and numerous local newspaper reports.
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These figures represent increases in each category of at least 1,000%
since 1930.
The city's water system is fully integrated; that is, the water distribution system is interconnected. Thus, if the water table declines
in one well field, the city can cease pumpage there and secure needed
water from wells in other locations.
E. Tucson Area Schools' '
Tucson School District Number One, Sunnyside School District,
Ampitheater School District and the University of Arizona all pump
some or all of their own water. This is done instead of purchasing
water from the City of Tucson. Personnel associated with each of
these schools argue that it would be much more expensive to purchase city water.
4

F. Private Water Companies 1
According to one 1966 estimate, there were 407 private water
companies certified for operation in Arizona. About 140 are located
in Pima County, and about half of those located in or near the City
of Tucson. They all sell groundwater pumped from the local groundwater basin.
These private water companies vary greatly in size. Some are only
"paper" companies, holding Corporation Commission certificates
but having no physical plant in operation. Also, many small companies were constructed by home developers to supply water for use
in newly developed subdivisions. On the other hand, some are rather
large corporations. One has over 1800 customers, twenty wells, and
pumps over 200 million gallons of water annually. Some companies
are owned and operated by local interests while others are controlled
by out-of-state interests.
G. Minor Service Organizations
There are numerous other organizations in the Tucson area which,
in some manner, are involved in water management. These include
two irrigation districts, an air force base, several large manufacturing
firms, several hotels and motels, two hospitals and hundreds of
private persons, all of whom pump limited amounts of groundwater
for their own purposes.
13. Data from interviews with Messrs. Jay Abbey, Paul Beermann, Frank Brooks, Gordon
Davis, Mark Keane, John Rausher, William Wheeler, all associated with the City of Tucson,
and John Bauman, Earl Hamilton, Fred V. Hopkins, James Irwin, H. V. Summers and
Francis Vesey, all associated with Tucson area schools,
14. Id.
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H. IntergovernmentalRelations
The geographic and hydrologic characteristics of the Santa Cruz
Basin, in combination with an absence of restrictive legislation, account in large part for the atomized pattern of organization described above. Water is available to anyone who, with minimal expense, desires to sink a well anywhere in the basin. No state law
exists to prevent this.
What are the implications of Tucson's physical characteristics and
organizational pattern of water service in efforts to solve the "water
problem"? Events to date indicate that the present pattern of organization-or more accurately, non-organization-precludes the generation of the type of decisions necessary to solve the problem. Instead, considerable conflict has been generated.
Almost without exception this conflict has involved efforts by the
City of Tucson to play the leading role in area-wide water management. City officials are very concerned about the declining level of
the groundwater table and feel that prompt action is needed to halt,
or at least slow, the rate of decline. They feel that supplemental
water sources must be developed and water management integrated
so as to preserve local groundwater and to equalize the cost of water
importation among all water users.
City personnel believe that reduced and judicious use of local
groundwater will permit the construction of smaller import facilities
and result in a savings. They contend that if import facilities are
constructed and current groundwater pumping is reduced now, local
groundwater can be saved and used to meet the peak-period demands
of the summer months. Prompt action to preserve some local groundwater by reducing annual pumpage to the level of annual recharge
will, they feel, permit the use of the local basin as a "water bank."
Further, total management integration allegedly will help prevent the
drying out and destruction of aquifers.
In recent years the City has spent large sums of money on research
and development of supplemental water sources. It has purchased
land in the San Pedro Valley east of Tucson with an eye toward
possible development of well fields sometime in the future. The City
has purchased land to the west, in the Altar-Avra Valley, and developed a well field there. It has contributed money to the Central
Arizona Project Association's efforts to secure passage of the Central
Arizona Project and has lent financial aid to various water research
projects at the University of Arizona.
Except for water research at the University of Arizona, which is
largely supported by federal funds (plus small contributions from
Pima County, Pima County Sanitary District Number One and Tuc-
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son Gas and Electric Company), the City of Tucson "has largely gone
it alone" in efforts to integrate management and to import water
from outside the basin. Many city personnel feel that this is unfair to
the city's taxpayers and water customers.
As a result of its desire to integrate water management, to develop
supplemental water sources and to equalize the costs, the City has
long tried to get the schools to stop pumping water and to purchase
city water. Further, the City has tried to purchase local and nearby
water companies. These efforts have involved the City in heated and
prolonged conflict with private water companies, the county, the
schools, and the Corporation Commission.
CONCLUSIONS
As is so often the case in metropolitan areas, little has been done
to deal with the apparent water shortage in the Tucson area, until
very recently. While there have been some attempts to produce
intendedly remedial policy, these have been largely unilateral. Intergovernmental (sub-system) relations have tended to be characterized
by conflict rather than cooperation.
The Tucson water system is politically fragmented, and its numerous sub-systems vary widely in terms of functions, resources, and
demands. Personnel connected with all sub-systems are aware of the
declining water table, and they agree that a shortage exists and that
there is cause for concern. In spite of widespread agreement that the
community is in need of more water, a propensity to incur decisioncosts so as to create additional sources has developed unevenly
throughout the system. The willingness of the various sub-systems to
pay decision-costs appear to vary with functions performed and with
demand-resource ratios.
The City of Tucson is the major water service agency in the Tucson area and is so recognized by the community. With the community facing what many perceive as a water shortage, attention is
focused upon the City, which thus is under community pressure to
play the lead role in coping with the problem. The City's resources
and its capacity to respond to this pressure are considerable in as
much as it is already in the water business. It has engaged in some
research and developement of new water sources (including lobbying
for the Central Arizona Project, and initiating development in the
Altar-Avara Valley) and it has attempted to involve other sub-systems
in cooperative efforts to integrate water service in the area and share
the research and development costs for additional water. In short,
because of public expectations, and given its demands-resources
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ratio, the City has chosen to incur some decision-costs so as to confront the supply problem.
Tucson area school districts, on the other hand, have chosen not
incur additional decision-costs. The districts' prime functions relate
to education-not to water management-and their budgets are, they
claim, already strained in attempts to meet public demands concerning tile schools. There is very little public expectation that the
schools will allocate resources so as to deal with the water problem.
They have no legal obligation to do so, and the City is unable to
apply sanctions and force the school districts to allocate resources.
Thus, for the schools, little is to be lost in the short run by refusing
to incur decision-costs. The decision-costs of action are greater than
the decision-costs of inaction-at least in the short run.
Faculty members in various academic departments at the University of Arizona perceive the existence of a water problem in the
Tucson area, and many of them are engaged in water research. Some
view the declining water table with greater alarm than do others, but
collectively their efforts constitute some University involvement with
the water problem. The University officially, however, has chosen not
to incur the costs of cooperating with City efforts to integrate all
water service. The University draws its own water from the basin,
and does so simply because it costs the University less to maintain its
own wells than to purchase city water.
Private water companies in the Tucson area incur no decision-costs
whatever relative to the water problem. Although pumping costs
increase as the water table level declines, private companies neither
cooperate with the City in attempts to coordinate water service nor
do they fund any research or development of supplemental water
sources. This behavior may be rational for the private companies in
the short run, but it is irrational in the long run. There are no legal,
economic or political sanctions on the private companies to force
them to share in the research and development costs in the search for
more water. Thus, they can maximize short run profits by refusing to
incur any new decision-costs. Should the basin go dry, however, most
private companies would be forced to cease operations, and thus lose
in the longer run.
Neither Pima County, the Arizona Corporation Commission nor
the State Land Department are prepared to undertake innovative
action to deal with the water problem. Each of these agencies performs water-related functions which are essentially regulatory in nature and which are spelled out in law. Aside from some pressure,
unaccompanied by sanction, from the City of Tucson, these agencies
are under no pressure to go beyond performance of legally prescribed
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duties. They are unwilling to risk the decision-costs which innovative
action might incur.
What is the import of all this for future problem solving-both in
Tucson and elsewhere? I would suggest that public policy designed to
improve the environment tends to be formed and applied to conditions which have been externally defined as problems only when
such conditions are preceived by the decision-makers in viable political systems and sub-systems as being of sufficient salience to warrant
the payment of the decision-costs which will be incurred in efforts to
alter the environment and eliminate the problem. Thus, problems
which now seem to go unattended will receive more efficacious attention than they now receive only when the following factors come
into play: (1) when political boundaries are altered so as to match
problem boundaries, thus clearly placing the burden of problem solving on the shoulders of the single relevant local government; (2)
when a problem reaches crisis proportions and demands for remedial
action increase, thus altering demand-resource ratios; (3) when resources are increased-when, for example, federal funds become
available, (4) when state law is changed, thus officially charging local
governments with previously unassigned duties; and/or (5) when increased demands, increased resources, changes in the law or increased
education act to alter the perceptions of decision-makers. In short,
action to solve metro-urban problems may well depend upon the
constant existence of real or imagined crisis conditions, continued
and increased use of federal funds by state and local govenments, or
major alterations in state law relative to local governmental boundaries, powers and finances.

